The AGREEMENT on the guarantee of voluntary offers by the United Kingdom with the IAEA and Euratom came into force in 1978 and specifies the acceptance by the United Kingdom of the application of the IAEA safeguards “on all sources or special fissile materials in facilities or parts of them within the United Kingdom, which are excluded only for national security reasons.” The five nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have entered into voluntary agreements on supply guarantees under which the IAEA applies safeguards for nuclear materials in facilities that the State has voluntarily proposed and has chosen the IAEA for the application of security measures. The IAEA applies safeguards as part of a voluntary offer agreement to ensure that nuclear materials remain in peaceful activities and are not removed from security measures, unless provided for in the agreement. All non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to the NPT, as well as States parties to regional treaties establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, are required to enter into comprehensive protection agreements with the IAEA. These agreements are concluded on the basis of INFCIRC/153 (corrected). A State undertakes to accept the IAEA`s safeguard measures for all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities on its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control. Under these agreements, the IAEA has the right and duty to ensure that safeguards are put in place on all nuclear materials to ensure that these materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The five nuclear-weapon States of nuclear non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have entered into safeguard agreements for some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. As part of these voluntary supply agreements, agencies are notified by the State concerned to the IAEA and offered for the application of safeguard measures. The IAEA applies safeguards under voluntary agreements to supply nuclear materials at selected facilities.
Although the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) does not require its five partner nuclear weapons (NWS) states to enter into safeguard agreements, the States concerned (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) have voluntary supply guarantee agreements with the IAEA. This was in part intended to allay the concerns expressed by non-nuclear states that their nuclear industry might have a commercial disadvantage. The UK safeguard agreement with the IAEA, signed on 7 June, replaces the Euratom agreements and contributes to the continued continuation of inspection and inspection activities. The Protection Act allows the UK to put in place a national protection system. The conclusion of a safeguards agreement was also essential for the conclusion of new nuclear cooperation agreements, in order to replace the Euratom agreements that facilitate the importation of British nuclear materials necessary for its civilian nuclear programme.